Sur le mensonge : langage figuré, mensonges indirects et l’engagement du locuteur
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.59866/eia.v1i70.292Mots-clés :
mensonge, ironie, engagement du locuteur, métaphore, implicature, denegationRésumé
L’objectif de ce travail est de clarifier ce qu’est le mensonge, ou en quoi consiste le mensonge. Tout d’abord, j’explique le débat en cours sur la définition pragmatique du mensonge, en me focalisant sur trois questions : la question du dire, la question de la fausseté et la question de l’intention de tromper. Ensuite, j’aborde le problème posé par les implicatures non sincères dans la définition du mensonge. En particulier, j’explique pourquoi je crois qu’il faut considérer ces implicatures comme des mensonges, et je soutiens que s’appuyer sur l’idée de l’engagement du locuteur est la meilleure façon de définir les mensonges en général, et les mensonges communiqués par des implicatures en particulier.
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(c) Tous droits réservés Joana Garmendia 2025
Ce travail est disponible sous licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d’Utilisation Commerciale 4.0 International.
Données de Fonds
-
Eusko Jaurlaritza
Numéros de subventions IT1612-22 -
Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades
Numéros de subventions PID2023-151480NB-I00;MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033;ERDF/EU
