Gezurra dirudi: hizkuntza figuratiboa, zeharkako gezurrak eta hiztunaren konpromisoa

Joana Garmendia

doi:10.59866/eia.v1i70.292

Egileak

Joana Garmendia Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea (UPV/EHU) https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5743-6396

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.59866/eia.v1i70.292

Gako-hitzak:

gezurra, ironia, hiztunaren konpromisoa, metafora, inplikatura, ukagarritasuna

Laburpena

Gezurra zer den, edo gezurra esatea zertan datzan, argitzea da lan honen helburua. Hasteko, pragmatikaren esparruan gezurraren definizioak sortu dituen eztabaidak azaldu ditut, hiru auzi ardatz hartuta: esatearen auzia, faltsutasunaren auzia eta engainatzeko asmoaren auzia. Ondoren, gezurrak definitzean inplikatura ez-zintzoek sortzen duten korapiloari jarri diot arreta: azaldu dut zergatik uste dudan inplikatura horiek gezurtzat hartu behar direla, eta bidenabar defendatu dut hiztunaren konpromisoaren ideian oinarrituta azaltzen direla ondoen gezurrak, oro har, eta inplikatura bidezko gezurrak, zehazki.

Deskargak

Oraindik ez dago deskargen inguruko informaziorik.

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